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Abstract
We present a contextualist statistical realistic model for quantum-
like representations in physics, cognitive science and psychology. We
apply this model to describe cognitive experiments to check quantum-
like structures of mental processes. The crucial role is played by inter-
ference of probabilities for mental observables. Recently one of such
experiments based on recognition of images was performed. This ex-
periment confirmed our prediction on quantum-like behaviour of mind.
In our approach “quantumness of mind” has no direct relation to the
fact that the brain (as any physical body) is composed of quantum
particles. We invented a new terminology “quantum-like (QL) mind.”
Cognitive QL-behaviour is characterized by nonzero coefficient of in-
terference λ. This coefficient can be found on the basis of statistical
data. There is predicted not only cos θ-interference of probabilities,
but also hyperbolic cosh θ-interference. This interference was never
observed for physical systems, but we could not exclude this possibil-
ity for cognitive systems. We propose a model of brain functioning as
QL-computer (there is discussed difference between quantum and QL
computers).
∗Supported in part by the EU Human Potential Programme, contact HPRN–CT–2002–
00279 (Network on Quantum Probability and Applications) and Profile Math. Modelling
of Va¨xjo¨ University.
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1 Introduction
The idea that the description of brain functioning, cognition and conscious-
ness could not be reduced to the theory of neural networks and dynamical
systems (cf. Ashby (1952), Hopfield (1982), Amit (1989), Bechtel and Abra-
hamsen (1991), Strogatz (1994), van Gelder (1995), van Gelder and Port
(1995), Eliasmith (1996)) and that quantum theory may play an impor-
tant role in such a description was discussed in the huge variety of forms,
see e.g. Whitehead (1929, 1933, 1939), Orlov (1982), Healey (1984), Al-
bert and Loewer (1988, 1992), Lockwood (1989, 1996), Penrose (1989, 1994),
Donald (1990, 1995, 1996), Jibu and Yasue (1992, 1994), Bohm and Hi-
ley (1993), Stapp (1993), Hameroff (1994, 1998), Loewer (1996), Hiley and
Pylkka¨nen (1997), Deutsch (1997), Barrett (1999), Khrennikov (1999, 2000),
Hiley (2000), Vitiello (2001) and literature thereby. One of dominating ap-
proaches to application of quantum mechanics to the description of brain
functioning is quantum reductionism, see e.g. Hameroff (1994, 1998) and
R. Penrose (1989, 1994). This was a new attempt of physical reduction of
mental processes, cf. Ashby (1952), Hopfield (1982), Amit (1989). This is
an interesting project of great complexity and it is too early to try to make
any conclusion about its future. One of important contributions of quan-
tum reductionism in the study of mental processes is the strong critique of
the classical reductionist approach (neural networks and dynamical systems
approach) and artificial intelligence, see especially Penrose (1994). On the
other hand, quantum reductionism was strongly criticized by neurophysiol-
ogists and cognitive scientists who still belief that neuron is the basic unit
of procession of mental information. We can also mention the quantum logic
approach: mind cannot be described by classical logic and therefore the for-
malism of quantum logic should be applied. It seems that Orlov (1982)
published the first paper in which this idea was explored. It is important to
remark that he discussed interference within a single mind (this is natural in
quantum logic). Such an interference was also discussed by Deutsch (1997).
We pay attention to extended investigations based on many-minds approach,
see Healey (1984), Albert and Loewer (1988, 1992), Lockwood (1989, 1996),
Donald (1990, 1995, 1996), Loewer (1996), Barrett (1999), etc. Finally, we
pay attention to attempts to apply Bohmian mechanics for description of
mental processes – Bohm and Hiley (1993), Hiley and Pylkka¨nen (1997),
Hiley (2000), Khrennikov (1999, 2000), Choustova (2004).
In this paper we also develop a kind of quantum theory of mind. From
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the very beginning we emphasize that our approach has nothing to do with
quantum reductionism. Of course, we do not claim that our approach im-
plies that quantum physical reduction of mind is totally impossible. But
our approach could explain the main quantum-like (QL) feature of mind –
interference of minds – without reduction of mental processes to quantum
physical processes. Regarding the quantum logic approach we can say that
our contextual statistical model is quite close mathematically to some models
of quantum logic (especially Mackey’s model, see e.g. Mackey (1963)), but
interpretations of mathematical formalisms are totally different. The crucial
point is that in our probabilistic model it is possible to combine realism with
the main distinguishing features of quantum probabilistic formalism such
as interference of probabilities, Born’s rule, complex probabilistic amplitudes,
Hilbert state space, representation of (realistic) observables by operators.
Why is the possibility to combine realism with quantum probabilistic
features so important for neurophysiology, cognitive sciences, psychology and
sociology?
A fundamental consequence of the possibility of such a combination is
that macroscopic neuronal structures (in particular, a single neuron) as well
as cognitive and psychological contexts could exhibit quantum-like features.
Thus we may escape the fundamental problem that disturbs so much the
program of the quantum physical reductionism:
How might one combine the neuronal and quantum models?
This was a terrible problem e.g. for Penrose (1994): “It is hard to see
how one could usefully consider a quantum superposition consisting of one neuron
firing, and simultaneously nonfiring.”
In our contextual statistical model it is possible to operate with quantum-
like probabilities without such a notion as superposition of states of a single
system. All distinguishing probabilistic features of quantum mechanics can
be obtained without it. This implies that (in the opposite to quantum reduc-
tionists) we need not look for some microscopic basis of mental processes.1
In our model “mental interference” is not based on superposition of indi-
vidual quantum states. Mental interference is described in classical (but
contextual) probabilistic framework. A mental wave function represent not
1We remark that reductionists should do this and go to the deepest scales of space and
time to find some resonable explanation of superposition and interference (S. Homeroff
should go inside microtubules and R. Penrose even deeper – to scales of quantum gravity).
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a mental state of an individual cognitive system, but a neurophysiological,
cognitive or psychological context C. 2
As was already remarked, from the mathematical point of view our prob-
abilistic model is quite close to the well know Mackey’s model.3 George
Mackey (1963) presented a program of huge complexity and importance:
To deduce the probabilistic formalism of quantum mechanics starting with
a system of natural probabilistic axioms.
(Here “natural” has the meaning a natural formulation in classical proba-
bilistic terms.) G. Mackey tried to realize this program starting with a system
of 8 axioms – Mackey axioms, see Mackey (1963). This was an important step
in clarification of the probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics. However,
he did not totally succeed (as was recognized by himself, see Mackey (1963)
and section 2 for details). The crucial axiom (about the complex Hilbert
space) was not formulated in natural (classical) probabilistic terms.
In Khrennikov (2001, 2002, 2003) there was presented a new attempt of
realization of Mackey’s program. In our approach the probabilistic structure
of quantum mechanics (including the complex Hilbert space) can be derived
on the basis of two axioms formulated in classical (but contextual!) proba-
bilistic terms. This realization of Mackey’s program gives the possibilty to
combine realism and quantum probabilistic behavior (see previous discussion
on quantum reductionism of mental prosses).
Comparing the Bohmian mental models and our contextual quantum-like
model we can say that our model does not provide individual description of
2We again pay attention that our comparation of contextual approach and quantum
reductionism could not be used as an argument against the last one. One could not exclude
the possibility that mental processes could be reduced to quantum physical processes, e.g.
in microtubules, or that the act of consiousness is really induced by the collapse of a
wave function of superposition of two mass states. But our model gives the possibility
to proceed with quantum mathematical formalism in neurophysiology, cognitive science,
psychology and sociology without using all those tricky things that are so important in
the reductionist approach.
3In fact, Mackey’s work (1963) was the starting point of my investigations and I was
really lucky that I met George Mackey at the conference of “Quantum Structures As-
sociation” (Castiglioncello, Italy, 1992) and discussed with him probabilistic foundations
of quantum mechanics. I also was strongly influenced by Stan Gudder. His papers, see
e.g. Gudder (2001), as well as numerous discussions with him played an important role in
creation of my contextual statistical realistic model. General philosophic debates with C.
Fuchs and A. Plotnitsky, see even Fuchs (2002) and Plotnitsky (2002), played an important
role in creation of so called Va¨xjo¨ interpretation, see Khrennikov (2002).
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mental processes. We could not describe a “trajectory of an individual mind”,
we are able only describe “probability distributions of minds.” By using the
terminology of Atmanspacher et al. (2001) we can say that Bohmian men-
tal models provide the ontic description of mental processes and our model
provides the epistemic description. Our epistemic (contextual probabilistic)
model does not contradict to the possibility that on the ontic level mental
world can be described by Bohmian mechanics. On the other hand, our
model does not imply that precisely Bohmian mechanics is the right ontic
mental model. In principle, there might be found other ontic mental models
which could be more adequate the problem under consideration. Another
fundamental feature of Bohmian mechanics is its nonlocality. Nonlocality
of this model has important consequences for cognitive science; especially
the problem of consciousness. Bohm, Hiley and Pylkka¨nen developed a new
philosophic systems – philosophy of wholeness and applied it to the problem
of consiousness. Khrennikov (1999, 2000) proposed a mathematical model of
mental space given by an infinite p-adic tree. Minds were represented by infi-
nite branches of tree; they were coupled by mental pilot waves. In Choustova
(2004) there was presented a model of psycho-financial market with traders
coupled by mental pilot waves.
We say a few words about many-minds approach: Healey (1984), Al-
bert and Loewer (1988, 1992), Lockwood (1989, 1996), Donald (1990, 1995,
1996), Loewer (1996), Barrett (1999), etc.. This approach played an im-
portant role in justification of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum
mechanics. There is no direct contradiction between our contextual realistic
and many-worlds interpretations. We recall that the many-worlds interpre-
tation was invented as an attempt to explain some mysteries of quantum
mechanics. We agree that there were naturally explained a few things that
were really mysterious in the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation.4 In par-
ticular, it seems that only the many-worlds interpretation provides a reson-
able exlpanation of quantum parallelism (which plays the fundamental role
in quantum computing). Therefore many-minds interpretation is so natural
for various models of brain as a physical device performing quantum compu-
tations. We also can escape conventional Copenhagen mysteries by using our
contextual realistic model. Connections between our model and the many-
worlds/many-minds approaches will be discussed in more detail in section
12.
4This interpretation is typically considered in the quantum reductionist approach.
5
Before having a closer look at our model, it is perhaps necessary to discuss
the meaning of the term contextuality, as it can obviously be interpreted in
many different ways. The most common meaning (especially in the literature
on quantum logic) is that the outcome for a measurement of an observable
u under a contextual model is calculated using a different (albeit hidden)
measure space, depending on whether or not compatible observables v, w, ...
were also made in the same experiment. We remark that well known “no-go”
theorems cannot be applied to such contextual models.5
In our approach the term contextuality is used in a totally different mean-
ing. Roughly speaking our approach is noncontextual from the conventional
viewpoint. Values associated to two specially chosen observables – the refer-
ence observables 6 – are considered as objective properties of systems (phys-
ical, cognitive,..., social). These observables are therefore not contextual in
the sense of Bohr’s measurement contextuality.
The basic notion of our approach is the context – that is, a complex of
physical, biological, cognitive, psychological, social, or economic conditions.
Systems (physical, biological, ..., economic) interact with a context C and in
this process a statistical ensemble SC is formed; cf. e.g. Ballentine (2001).
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Conditional (or better to say contextual) probabilities for reference ob-
servables, P(a = y/C),P(b = x/C), are used to represent the context C by
a complex probability amplitude ψC . This amplitude is in fact encoded in a
generalization of the formula of total probability describing the interference
of probabilities. Note that interferences of probabilities can thus be obtained
in a classical probabilistic framework (i.e., without the need of the Hilbert
space formalism), an observation which was actually the starting point of our
considerations. Our approach is thus based on two cornerstones:
5This approach to contextuality can be considered as a mathematical formalization of
Bohr’s measurement contextuality, see Plotnitsky (2001, 2002) for details. Bohr’s inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics is in fact considered as contextual; for N. Bohr the word
“context” had the meaning of a “context of a measurement.”
6For example, physical observables, or observables on neuronal structures, or observ-
ables corresponding to performing of cognitive or psychological tasks, or questions asked
to a group of people. E.g., position and momentum in physics; in Conte et al. (2004)
there were considered two cognitive tasks based on recognition of hidden structures of two
different images.
7The notion of context is close to the notion of preparation procedure, see e.g. Holevo
(2001). However, for any preparation procedure E , it is assumed that this procedure could
be (at least in principle) realized experimentally. We do not assume this for an arbitrary
context C.
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a) contextuality of probabilities;
b) the use of two fixed incompatible observables (physical, biological, cog-
nitive, psychological, social, or economic) in order to represent the classical
contextual probabilistic model in the complex Hilbert space.
Section 2.1 is devoted to the presentation of our general contextual statis-
tical model (Va¨xjo¨ model); in section 2.2. there is considered the ensemble
representation of contextual statistical models (cf. with so called statisti-
cal interpretation of quantum mechanics of Einstein, Margenau, ..., see e.g.
Ballentine (2001), Holevo (2001); in section 2.3 we discuss the possibility to
apply this model outside physics (in particular, in cognitive science, psychol-
ogy and sociology). In sections 4–10 we apply our model to description of
mental observations in the quantum-like terms. We start with mental in-
terference which is defined as interference of probability distributions of two
incompatible mental observables. For example, in psychology such observ-
ables can be realized in the form of two incompatible questions which are
asked to people participating in a test.
In our model incompatibility of two mental observables is defined in purely
classical probabilistic terms.8 A condition of incompatibility can be easily
checked on the basis of experimental statistical data collected e.g. in the
form of “yes-no” answers to questions. The magnitude of mental interfer-
ence is characterized by a coefficient of interference (or incompatibility) λ.
Depending on this magnitude we obtain different representations of proba-
bilities in experiments with cognitive systems. In particular, we obtain the
quantum-like representation in the complex Hilbert space.
This approach should be justified experimentally. A priory there are no
reasons that cognitive systems may exhibit the quantum-like probabilistic be-
haviour; in particular, nontrivial mental interference. Therefore we presented
the detailed description of an experimental test to check the hypothesis on
the quantum-like probabilistic behaviour. We hope that such tests would
be performed in various domains of mental sciences: psychology, cognitive
science, sociology, economics. Some preliminary experiments were already
done Conte et al. (2004) and they confirmed that in some psychological
experiments students can exhibit quantum-like probabilistic behaviour. In
section 8 we present a model of brain’s functioning as QL-computer. There
8This classical probabilistic incompatibility implies noncommutativity of operators aˆ
and bˆ corresponding to mental observables a and b. But such a representation is not basic;
it is induced by classical (contextual) proabbilistic representation.
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is discussed difference between conventional quantum and QL computers, es-
pecially regarding to quantum parallelism. In section 12 we shall compare
in more detail the many-minds and Va¨xjo¨ approaches. Finally, in section 13
we discuss the notion of macroscopic quantum system and give motivations
to consider human beings as macroscopic quantum systems.
The paper is written to be readable by researchers working in biology,
cognitive and social sciences, psychology. There is used not so much mathe-
matics. Only in section 5 we present rather long mathematical expressions.
In principle, this section can be omitted if one accepts that there exists an
algorithm which gives the possibility to construct a complex probability am-
plitude – “wave function” – on the basis of contextual probabilities.
2 Contextual statistical realistic model
A general statistical realistic model for observables based on the contextual
viewpoint to probability will be presented. It will be shown that classical as
well as quantum probabilistic models can be obtained as particular cases of
our general contextual model, the Va¨xjo¨ model.9 Realism is one of the main
distinguishing features of the Va¨xjo¨ model since it is always possible manip-
ulate objective properties, despite the presence of such essentially quantum
effects as, e.g., the interference of probabilities.
As George W. Mackey (1963) pointed out, probabilities cannot be con-
sidered as abstract quantities defined outside any reference to a concrete
complex of physical conditions C. All probabilities are conditional or better
to say contextual.10 G. Mackey did a lot to unify classical and quantum
probabilistic description and, in particular, demystify quantum probability.
One crucial step is however missing in Mackey’s work. In his book Mackey
(1963) introduced the quantum probabilistic model (based on the complex
Hilbert space) by means of a special axiom (Axiom 7, p. 71) that looked
rather artificial in his general conditional probabilistic framework.
9This model is not reduced to the conventional, classical and quantum models. In
particular, it contains a new statistical model: a model with hyperbolic cosh-interference
that induces ”hyperbolic quantum mechanics”, Khrennikov (2003).
10We remark that the same point of view can be found in the works of A. N. Kol-
mogorov and R. von Mises. However, it seems that Mackey’s book was the first thorough
presentation of a program of conditional probabilistic description of measurements, both
in classical and quantum physics.
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Mackey’s model is based on a system of eight axioms, when our own model
requires only two axioms. Let us briefly mention the content of Mackey first
axioms. The first four axioms concern conditional structure of probabilities,
that is, they can be considered as axioms of a classical probabilistic model.
The fifth and sixth axioms are of a logical nature (about questions). We
reproduce below Mackey’s “quantum axiom”, and Mackey’s own comments
on this axiom (see pp. 71-72):
Axiom 7 (G. Mackey) The partially ordered set of all questions in quan-
tum mechanics is isomorphic to the partially ordered set of all closed subsets
of a separable, infinite dimensional Hilbert space.11
Our activity can be considered as an attempt to find a list of physically
plausible assumptions from which the Hilbert space structure can be deduced.
We show that this list can consist in two axioms (see our Axioms 1 and 2)
and that these axioms can be formulated in the same classical probabilistic
manner as Mackey’s Axioms 1–4.
2.1 Contextual statistical model of observations
A physical or mental context C is a complex of physical or mental conditions.
Contexts are fundamental elements of any contextual statistical model. Thus
construction of any model M should be started with fixing the collection of
contexts of this model; denote the collection of contexts by the symbol C (so
the family of contexts C is determined by M). In mathematical formalism C
is an abstract set (of “labels” of contexts). Another fundamental element of
any contextual statistical model M is a set of observables O : any observable
a ∈ O can be measured under a complex of physical conditions C ∈ C. For an
a ∈ O, we denote the set of its possible values (“spectrum”) by the symbol
Xa.
We do not assume that all these observables can be measured simultane-
ously. To simplify considerations, we shall consider only discrete observables
11“This axiom has rather a different character from Axioms 1 through 4. These all had
some degree of physical naturalness and plausibility. Axiom 7 seems entirely ad.hoc. Why
do we make it? Can we justify making it? What else might we assume? We shall discuss
these questions in turn. The first is the easiest to answer. We make it because it “works”,
that is, it leads to a theory which explains physical phenomena and successfully predicts
the results of experiments. It is conceivable that a quite different assumption would do
likewise but this is a possibility that no one seems to have explored. Ideally one would like
to have a list of physically plausible assumptions from which one could deduce Axiom 7.”
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and, moreover, all concrete investigations will be performed for dichotomous
observables.
Axiom 1: For any observable a ∈ O, there are defined contexts Cα
corresponding to α-filtrations: if we perform a measurement of a under the
complex of physical conditions Cα, then we obtain the value a = α with
probability 1. It is supposed that the set of contexts C contains filtration-
contexts Cα for all observables a ∈ O.
Axiom 2: There are defined contextual probabilities P(a = α/C) for any
context C ∈ C and any observable a ∈ O .
Probabilities P(b = β/C) are interpreted as contextual (conditional) prob-
abilities. Especially important role will be played by probabilities:
pa/b(α/β) ≡ P(a = α/Cβ), a, b ∈ O, α ∈ Xa, β ∈ Xb,
where Cβ is the [b = β]-filtration context. For any C ∈ C, there is defined the
set of probabilities: {P(a = α/C) : a ∈ O}. We complete this probabilistic
data by Cβ-contextual probabilities:
D(O, C) = {P(a = α/C),P(b = β/C), ...,P(a = α/Cβ),P(b = β/Cα), ...},
where a, b, ... ∈ O. We denote the collection of probabilistic data D(O, C)
for all contexts C ∈ C by the symbol D(O, C).12
Definition 2.1. A contextual statistical model of reality is a triple
M = (C,O,D(O, C)) (1)
where C is a set of contexts and O is a set of observables which satisfy to
axioms 1,2, and D(O, C) is probabilistic data about contexts C obtained with
the aid of observables O.
We call observables belonging to the set O ≡ O(M) reference of observ-
ables. Inside of a model M observables belonging to the set O give the only
possible references about a context C ∈ C.
12We remark that D(O, C) does not contain the simultaneous probability distribution
of observables a, b ∈ O (under the context C). Data D(O, C) gives a probabilistic image
of the context C through the system of observables O. There is defined the map: pi :
C → D(O, C), pi(C) = D(O, C). In general this map is not one-to-one. Thus the pi-image
of contextual reality is very rough: not all contexts can be distinguished with the aid of
probabilistic data produced by the class of observables O.
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Definition 2.3. Reference observables are said to be mutually incompat-
ible if
pa/b(α/β) 6= 0, α ∈ Xa, β ∈ Xb, (2)
for any pair a, b ∈ O.
We shall see that in the case O = {a, b}, where observables a and b are
incompatible, a contextual statistical model can be projected to the complex
Hilbert space. Our model can be completed by the realist interpretation of
reference observables a ∈ O. By the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation reference observ-
ables are interpreted as properties of contexts:
“If an observation of a under a complex of physical conditions C ∈ C gives
the result a = α, then this value is interpreted as the objective property of
the context C (at the moment of the observation).”
2.2 Systems, ensemble representation
We now complete the contextual statistical model by considering systems
ω (e.g., physical or cognitive, or social,..), cf. Ballentine (2001). In our
approach systems as well as contexts are considered as elements of realty.
In our model a context C ∈ C is represented by an ensemble SC of systems
which have been interacted with C. For such systems we shall use notation:
ω ←֓ C The set of all (e.g., physical or cognitive, or social) systems which
are used to represent all contexts C ∈ C is denoted by the symbol Ω ≡ Ω(C).
Thus we have a map:
C → SC = {ω ∈ Ω : ω ←֓ C}. (3)
This is the ensemble representation of contexts. We set
S ≡ S(C) = {S : S = SC , C ∈ C}.
This is the collection of all ensembles representing contexts belonging to C.
The ensemble representation of contexts is given by the map (3)
I : C → S
Reference observables O are now interpreted as observables on systems ω ∈
Ω. In our approach it is not forbidden to interpret the values of the reference
observables as objective properties of systems.13
13These objective properties coexist in nature and they can be related to individual
systems ω ∈ Ω. However, the probabilistic description is possible only with respect to a
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Definition 2.2. The ensemble representation of a contextual statistical
model M = (C,O,D(O, C)) is a triple
S(M) = (S,O,D(O, C)) (4)
where S is a set of ensembles of systems representing contexts C, O is a set
of observables, and D(O, C) is probabilistic data about ensembles S obtained
with the aid of observables O.
2.3 Applications of Va¨xjo¨ model in cognitive science,
psychology, sociology
Our contextualist statistical realistic models can be used not only in physics,
but in any domain of natural and social sciences. Besides of complexes of
physical conditions, we can consider complexes of biological, cognitive, social,
economic,... conditions – contexts – as elements of reality. Such elements of
reality are represented by probabilistic data obtained with the aid of reference
observables (biological, mental, social, economic,...).
In the same way as in physics in some special cases it is possible to encode
such data by complex amplitudes. In this way we obtain representations of
some biological, cognitive, social, economic,.... models in complex Hilbert
spaces. We call them complex quantum-like models. These models describe
the usual cos-interference of probabilities. We recall again that such a rep-
resentation is based on a generalized formula of total probability having the
interference term, see section 3.
fixed context C. Noncontextual probabilities have no meaning. So values a(ω) and b(ω)
coexist for a single system ω ∈ Ω, but in general noncontextual (“absolute”) probabilities
P(ω ∈ Ω : a(ω) = y), ... are not defined. Thus, instead of mutual exclusivity of observables
(cf. Bohr’s principle of complementarity), we consider contextuality of probabilities and
“supplementarity” of the reference observables (in the sense that they give supplementary
statistical information about contexts). In particular, we can speak about “supplemen-
tarity of minds.” Such a supplementarity does not imply mutual exclusivity of minds;
they just complete each other. It might be better to change terminology and speak about
supplementarity of mental reference observables and not incompatibility.
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3 Test of quantum-like structure of mental
statistics
3.1 Cognitive and social contexts
We consider examples of cognitive contexts:
1). C can be some selection procedure which is used to select a special
group SC of people or animals. Such a context is represented by this group
SC (so this is an ensemble of cognitive systems). For example, we select a
group Sprof.math. of professors of mathematics (and then ask questions a or
(and) b or give corresponding tasks). We can select a group of people of
some age. We can select a group of people having a “special mental state”:
for example, people in love or hungry people (and then ask questions or give
tasks).
2). C can be a learning procedure which is used to create some special
group of people or animals. For example, rats can be trained to react to
special stimulus.
3). C can be a collection of painting, Cpainting, (e.g. the collection of
Hermitage in Sankt-Peterburg) and people interact with Cpainting by looking
at pictures(and then there are asked questions about this collection to those
people).
4). C can be, for example, “context of classical music”, Ccl.mus., and
people interact with Ccl.mus. be listening in to this music. In principle, we
need not use an ensemble of different people. It can be one person whom
we ask questions each time after he has listened in to CD (or radio) with
classical music. In the latter case we should use not ensemble, but frequency
(von Mises) definition of probability.
The last example is an important illustration why from the beginning
we prefer to start with the general contextualist ideology and only then we
consider the possibility to represent contexts by ensembles of systems. A cog-
nitive context should not be identified with an ensemble of cognitive systems
representing this context. For us Ccl.mus. is by itself an element of reality.
We can also consider social contexts. For example, social classes: proletariat-
context, bourgeois-context; or war-context, revolution-context, context of
economic depression, poverty-context and so on. Thus our model can be
used in social and political sciences (and even in history). We can try to find
quantum-like statistical data in these sciences.
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3.2 Observables
We describe mental interference experiment.
Let a = x1, x2 and b = y1, y2 be two dichotomous mental observables:
x1=‘yes’, x2=‘no’, y1=‘yes’, y2=‘no’. We set X ≡ Xa = {x1, x2}, Y ≡ Xb =
{y1, y2} (“spectra” of observables a and b). Observables can be two different
questions or two different types of cognitive tasks. We use these two fixed
reference observables for probabilistic representation of cognitive contextual
reality given by C. 14
3.3 Quantum-like structure of experimental mental
data
We perform observations of a under the complex of cognitive conditions C :
pa(x) =
the number of results a = x
the total number of observations
, x ∈ X.
So pa(x) is the probability to get the result x for observation of the a under
the complex of cognitive conditions C. In the same way we find probabilities
pb(y) for the b-observation under the same cognitive context C. 15
As was supposed in section 2.1 (Axiom 1), there can be created cognitive
contexts Cy corresponding to selections with respect to fixed values of the
b-observable. The context Cy (for fixed y ∈ Y ) can be characterized in the
following way. By measuring the b-observable under the cognitive context
14Of course, by choosing another set of reference observables in general we shall obtain
another representation of cognitive contextual reality. Can we find two fundamental mental
observables? It is a very hard question. In physics everything is clear: the position
and momentum give us the fundamental pair of reference observables. Which mental
observables can be chosen as mental analogous of the position and momentum? In some
approaches to the quantum mechanics (e.g. in Bohmian mechanics) position is considered
as a fundamental observable, see De Broglie (1964) and D. Bohm (1951); momentum is
defined as the conjugate variable. Thus we are looking for a mental analog of position,
mental position.
15Probabilities can be ensemble probabilities or they can be time averages for mea-
surements over one concrete person (e.g., each time after listening in to classical music).
Measurements can be even self-measurements. For example, I can ask myself questions
a or b each time when I fall in love. These should be “hard questions” (incompatible
questions). By giving, e.g., the answer a = ‘yes′, I should make some important decision.
It will play an important role when I shall answer to the subsequent question b and vice
versa.
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Cy we shall obtain the answer b = y with probability one. We perform now
the a-measurements under cognitive contexts Cy for y = y1, y2, and find the
probabilities:
pa/b(x/y) =
the number of the result a = x under context Cy
the total number of observations under context Cy
, x ∈ X, y ∈ Y.
For example, by using the ensemble approach to probability we have
that the probability pa/b(x1/y2) is obtained as the frequency of the answer
a = x1 = ‘yes
′ in the ensemble of cognitive system that have already answered
b = y2 = ‘no
′. Thus we first select a subensemble of cognitive systems who
replies ‘no′ to the b-question, Cb=no. Then we ask systems belonging to Cb=no
the a-question.
It is assumed (and this is a very natural assumption) that a cognitive
system is “responsible for her (his) answers.” Suppose that a system τ has
answered b = y2 = ‘no
′. If we ask τ again the same question b we shall get
the same answer b = y2 = ‘no
′. This is nothing else than the mental form
of the von Neumann projection postulate, see von Neumann (1955): the
second measurement of the same observable, performed immediately after
the first one, will yield the same value of the observable (also Dirac (1933));
see section 3.4 for details.
The classical probability theory tells us that all these probabilities have to
be connected by the so called formula of total probability, see, e.g. Shiryayev
(1991):
pa(x) = pb(y1)p
a/b(x/y1) + p
b(y2)p
a/b(x/y2), x ∈ X.
However, if the theory is quantum-like, then we should obtain Khrennikov
(2001, 2002, 2003) the formula of total probability with an interference term:
pa(x) = pb(y1)p
a/b(x/y1) + p
b(y2)p
a/b(x/y2) (5)
+2λ(a = x/b, C)
√
pb(y1)pa/b(x/y1)pb(y2)pa/b(x/y2),
where the coefficient of incompatibility (the coefficient of interference) is
given by
λ(a = x/b, C) =
pa(x)− pb(y1)pa/b(x/y1)− pb(y2)pa/b(x/y2)
2
√
pb(y1)pa/b(x/y1)pb(y2)pa/b(x/y2)
(6)
This formula holds true for incompatible observables. To prove its validity, it
is sufficient to put the expression for λ(a = x/b, C), see (6), into (5).
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In the quantum-like statistical test for a cognitive context C we calculate
λ(a = x/b, C) =
pa(x)− pb(y1)pa/b(x/y1)− pb(y2)pa/b(x/y2)
2
√
pb(y1)pa/b(x/y1)pb(y2)pa/b(x/y2)
.
An empirical situation with λ(a = x/b, C) 6= 0 would yield evidence for
quantum-like behaviour of cognitive systems. In this case, starting with
(experimentally calculated) coefficient of interference λ(a = x/b, C) we can
proceed either to the conventional Hilbert space formalism (if this coefficient
is bounded by 1) or to so called hyperbolic Hilbert space formalism (if this
coefficient is larger than 1). In the first case the coefficient of interference
can be represented in the trigonometric form
λ(a = x/b, C) = cos θ(x),
Here θ(x) ≡ θ(a = x/b, C) is the phase of the a-interference between cognitive
contexts C and Cy, y ∈ Y. In this case we have the conventional formula of
total probability with the interference term:
pa(x) = pb(y1)p
a/b(x/y1) + p
b(y2)p
a/b(x/y2) (7)
+2 cos θ(x)
√
pb(y1)pa/b(x/y1)pb(y2)pa/b(x/y2).
In principle, it could be derived in the conventional Hilbert space formal-
ism. But we chosen the inverse way. Starting with (7) we could introduce
a “mental wave function” ψ ≡ ψC (or pure quantum-like mental state) be-
longing to this Hilbert space, see section 5. We recall that in our approach a
‘mental wave function’ ψ describes cognitive context C. This is nothing else
than a special mathematical encoding of probabilistic information about this
context which can be obtained with the aid of reference observables a and b.
3.4 Von Neumann postulate in cognitive science and
psychology
For further considerations (on a wave function) it is important to underline
that in general all above quantities can depend on a cognitive context C :
pa(x) = paC(x), p
b(y) = pbC(y), p
a/b(x/y) = p
a/b
C (x/y), θ(x) = θ
a/b
C (x).
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Dependence of probabilities paC(x), p
b
C(y) on a context C is irreducible (these
probabilities are defined by C). But in some cases dependence of the tran-
sition probabilities p
a/b
C (x/y) on C could be reducible. In the experimental
situation these probabilities (frequencies) are found in the following way.
First cognitive systems interact with a context C. In this way there is cre-
ated an ensemble SC of cognitive systems representing the context C. Then
cognitive systems belonging to the ensemble SC interact with a new context
Cy which is determined by the mental observable b. For example, students
belonging to a group SC (which was trained under the mental or social con-
ditions C) should answer to the question b. If this question is so disturbing
for a student ω that he would totally forget about the previous C-training,
then the transition probabilities do not depend on C : pa/b(x/y).
We remark that this is the case in conventional quantum theory. Here
for incompatible (noncomutative) observables the transition probabilities
pa/b(x/y) do not depend on the previous context C, i.e., a context preceding
the b = y filtration. In quantum theory any b = y filtration destroys the
memory on the preceding physical context C. This is our contextual inter-
pretation of the von Neumann projection postulate.
We do not know the general situation for cognitive systems.16 Our con-
jecture is that:
Postulate. (“von Neumann postulate for mental observable”) For any
pair a, b of incompatible mental observables the transition probability pa/b(x/y)
is completely determined by the preceding preparation – context Cy corre-
sponding to the [b = y]-filtration.
In principle, we could be satisfyed even by a weaker form of this postulate.
Postulate. (“Weak von Neumann postulate for mental observable”)
There exist incompatible mental observables a, b such that the transition prob-
ability pa/b(x/y) is completely determined by the preceding preparation – con-
text Cy corresponding to the [b = y]-filtration.
Finally, we remark that in our contextual approach the von Neumann
postulate (for physical as well as mental systems) is not so mysterious. This
is nothing else as the condition of Markovness for successive measurements.
16It might be that the von Neumann projection postulate can be violated by cognitive
systems. In such a case we would not be able to construct the conventional quantum
representation of contexts by complex probability amplitudes, cf. section 5.
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4 Hyperbolic interference of minds
As was already mentioned, statistical data obtained in experiments with
cognitive systems could produce the coefficient of interference which is larger
than 1. In general quantities
λ(a = x/b, C) =
pa(x)− pb(y1)pa/b(x/y1)− pb(y2)pa/b(x/y2)
2
√
pb(y1)pa/b(x/y1)pb(y2)pa/b(x/y2)
.
can extend 1 (see Khrennikov (2001, 2002, 2003) for examples). In this case
we can introduce a hyperbolic phase parameter θ ∈ [0,∞) such that
cosh θ(x) = ±p
a(x)− pb(y1)pa/b(x/y1)− pb(y2)pa/b(x/y2)
2
√
pb(y1)pa/b(x/y1)pb(y2)pa/b(x/y2)
.
In this case we can not proceed to the ordinary Hilbert space formalism. Nev-
ertheless, we can use an analog of the complex Hilbert space representation
for probabilities. Probabilities corresponding such cognitive contexts can be
represented in a hyperbolic Hilbert space – module over a two-dimensional
Clifford algebra, see Khrennikov (2001, 2002, 2003).17
In principle it may occur that |λ1| ≤ 1 and |λ2| > 1 or vice versa. In this
case we obtain hyper-trigonometric interference of minds.
5 Mental wave function
Let C be a cognitive context. We consider only cognitive contexts with
trigonometric interference for incompatible mental observables a and b. It is
assumed that the Weak von Neumann postulate for mental observable holds
for a and b. The interference formula of total probability (5) can be written
in the following form:
paC(x) =
∑
y∈Y
pbC(y)p
a/b(x/y) + 2 cos θC(x)
√
Πy∈Y p
b
C(y)p
a/b(x/y) (8)
By using the elementary formula:
D = A+B + 2
√
AB cos θ = |
√
A+ eiθ
√
B|2, A, B > 0,
17At the moment there are no experimental confirmations of hyperbolic interference for
cognitive systems. If such a result was obtained it would imply that cognitive systems
have more rich probabilistic structure than quantum systems.
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we can represent the probability pbC(x) as the square of the complex ampli-
tude:
paC(x) = |ψC(x)|2 (9)
where
ψ(x) ≡ ψC(x) =
∑
y∈Y
√
pbC(y)p
a/b(x/y)eiξC(x/y). (10)
Here phases ξC(x/y) are such that
ξC(x/y1)− ξC(x/y2) = θC(x).
We denote the space of functions: ψ : X → C by the symbol E = Φ(X,C).
Since X = {x1, x2}, the E is the two dimensional complex linear space.
Dirac’s δ−functions {δ(x1 − x), δ(x2 − x)} form the canonical basis in this
space. For each ψ ∈ E we have
ψ(x) = ψ(x1)δ(x1 − x) + ψ(x2)δ(x2 − x).
Denote by the symbol Ctr the set of all cognitive contexts having the
trigonometric statistical behaviour (i.e., |λ| ≤ 1) with respect to mental
observables a and b. By using the representation (10) we construct the map
J˜a/b : Ctr → Φ˜(X,C),
where Φ˜(X,C) is the space of equivalent classes of functions under the equiv-
alence relation: ϕ equivalent ψ iff ϕ = tψ, t ∈ C,|t| = 1.
To fix some concrete representation of a context C, we can choose, e.g.,
ξC(x/y1) = 0 and ξC(x/y2) = θC(x). Thus we construct the map
Ja/b : Ctr → Φ(X,C) (11)
The Ja/b maps cognitive contexts into complex amplitudes. The represen-
tation (9) of probability as the square of the absolute value of the complex
(a/b)−amplitude is nothing other than the famous Born rule. The com-
plex amplitude ψC can be called a mental wave function or pure mental state
(QL-state).
We emphasize that the map Ja/b is not surjective. It can happen that
Ja/b(C1) = J
a/b(C2) for different context C1 and C2 (if p
a
C1
(x) = paC2(x)
and pbC1(y) = p
b
C2
(y)). Such contexts are represented by the same complex
amplitude ψ(x) = ψC1(x) = ψC2(x). In particular, it can be that different
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cognitive contexts are represented by the same mental wave function ψ. We
shall come back to this problem in section 6. We set
eax(·) = δ(x− ·)
The representation (9) can be rewritten in the following form:
paC(x) = |(ψC , eax)|2 , (12)
where the scalar product in the space E = Φ(X,C) is defined by the standard
formula:
(ϕ, ψ) =
∑
x∈X
ϕ(x)ψ¯(x).
The system of functions {eax}x∈X is an orthonormal basis in the Hilbert space
H = (E, (·, ·))
Let X ⊂ R, where R is the set of real numbers. By using the Hilbert
space representation of Born’s rule (12) we obtain for the Hilbert space rep-
resentation of the classical conditional expectation:
E(a/C) =
∑
x∈X
xpa(x) =
∑
x∈X
x|ψC(x)|2 = (aˆψC , ψC) , (13)
where aˆ : Φ(X,C) → Φ(X,C) is the multiplication operator. This operator
can also be determined by its eigenvectors: aˆeax = xe
a
x, x ∈ X.
We notice that if the matrix of transition probabilities P a/b = (pa/b(x/y))
is double stochastic we can represent the mental observable b by a symmetric
operator bˆ in the same Hilbert space. In general operators aˆ and bˆ do not
commute, Khrennikov (2003).
6 Quantum-like projection of mental reality
We emphasize that the quantum-like representation is created through a
projection of underlying mental realistic model to the complex Hilbert space.
Such a projection induces a huge loss of information about the underlying
mental model. Thus the quantum-like model gives a very rough image of the
realistic model.
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6.1 Social opinion pull
Let us consider a family of social contexts C such that each context correspond
to society of some country: CUSA, CGB, CFR, ..., CGER, ... and let us consider
two reference observables given by questions:
a). “Are you against pollution?”
b). “Would you want to have lower prices for gasoline?”
It is supposed that observables a and b are incompatible:
pa/b(a = yes/b = no) 6= 0, pa/b(a = no/b = no) 6= 0,
pa/b(a = yes/b = yes) 6= 0, pa/b(a = no/b = yes) 6= 0.
Thus the corresponding social groups in the society are assumed to be sta-
tistically essential. Moreover, to get a quantum-like representation it should
be assumed that the transition probabilities pa/b(a = x/b = y) do not de-
pend on a society C. For example, the proportion of people who are against
pollution among people who are satisfied by prices for gasoline is the same
in USA, Great Britain, France and so on. Of course, this is a rather strong
assumption. And its validity should be checked.
The pull under consideration contains very important questions. In our
QL-model in those societies are represented by complex probability ampli-
tudes
ψUSA, ψGB, ψFR, ..., ψGER, ...
These mental wave functions can be used to investigate some essential fea-
tures of these societies. But, of course, answers to the questions a and b do
not completely characterize a society. Thus the quantum-like representation
induces the huge loss of information.
6.2 Quantum-like representation of functioning of neu-
ronal structures
Let us consider two coupled neural networks N1 and N2. We assume that
they are strictly hierarchic in the sense that there are “grandmother” neu-
rons n1 and n2 in networks N1 and N2, respectively.
18 The integral network
18The model of cognition based on grandmother neurons was dominating in 60 – 80th,
Amit (1989) . Later it was strongly criticized, but was not totally rejected. In the modified
approach there are considered grandmother neuronal groups, instead of single neurons.
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N = N1+N2 interacts with contexts C which are given by input signals into
both networks. For example, contexts C = {C} can be visual images and the
integral network N recognizes those images (e.g. N1 is responsible for coun-
tors and N2 for colors). We use so called frequency-domain approach, see for
example Hoppenstead (1997), and assume that cognitive information is pre-
sented by frequencies of firing of neurons. Consider two reference observables
a, b where a = 1 : n1 firing, and a = 0 : n1−nonfiring, and b = 1 : n2−firing,
and b = 0 : n2−nonfiring. Our quantum-like formalism gives the possibility
to represent each context C (e.g., an image C) by a complex probability
amplitude ψC . Here probabilities P(a = x/C),P(b = y/C) are defined as
frequencies. Such an amplitude can be reconstructed on the basis of mea-
surements on grandmother neurons n1 and n2. Of course, ψC gives only a
projection of the neuronal image of the context C. The complete neuronal
image is given by frequencies of firing of all neurons in the network N and the
QL-image ψC is based only on frequencies of firings of grandmother neurons.
However, we could not exclude that cognition (and consciousness) is really
based on such a QL-projecting of neronal states, see section 7.
6.3 Quantum-like representation of Freud’s psychoanal-
ysis
In its original form Freud’s psychoanalysis was based on the representation
of psychical states of patients through two groups of questions:
a : about recollections from childhood;
b : about sexual experiences.
Later Sigmund Freud was criticized for his attempt to reduce the psy-
chical state to the a, b-domains. He was especially strongly critisized for
overestimating the role of sexual experiences in childhood. From our point
of view Freud’s approach might be considered as the basis for creation of a
quantum-like representation based on the reference observables a and b. Of
course, a mental ψ-function based on observables a and b gives a very rough
representation of the underlying mental context of a patient, but nevetheless
it could be used to proceed mathematically.
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7 Quantum-like consiousness
The brain is a huge information systems which contains millions of minds.
It could not “recognize” (or “feel”) all those minds at each instant of time
t.19 Our fundamental hypothesis is that the brain is able to create the QL-
representations of minds. At each instant of time t the brain creates the QL-
representation of its mental context C based on two incompatible20 mental
(self-)observables a and b. Here a = (a1, ..., an) and b = (b1, ..., bn) can be very
long vectors of compatible dichotomous observables. The (self-)reference ob-
servables can be chosen (by the brain) in different ways at different instances
of time. Such a change of the reference observables is known in cognitive
sciences as a change of representation.
A mental context C in the a/b− representation is described by the mental
wave function ψC .We can speculate that the brain has the ability to feel this
mental field as a distribution on the space X. This distribution is given by
the norm-squared of the mental wave function: |ψC(x)|2. This mental QL-
wave contributes into the deterministic dynamics of minds, e.g. by inducing
Bohmian quantum potential, see e.g. Khrennikov (2000).
In such a model it might be supposed that the state of our consciousness
is represented by the mental wave function ψC . By using Freud’s terminology
we can say that one has classical subconsiousness and quantum-like consious-
ness, cf. Khrennikov (2000). QL-consiousness is represented by the mental
wave function ψC . The crucial point is that in this model consciousness is
created through neglecting an essential volume of information contained in
subconsciousness. Of course, this is not just a random loss of information.
Information is selected through the algorithm presented in section 5: context
C is projected onto ψC .
The (classical) mental state of subconsiousness evolves with time C →
C(t). This dynamics induces dynamics of the mental wave function ψ(t) =
ψC(t) in the complex Hilbert space, see Khrennikov (2004) for the mathemat-
19It may be more natural to consider mental (or psychological) time and not physical
time, see e.g. Khrennikov (2000). There are experimental evidences that: a) cognition
is not based on the continuous time processes (a moment in mental time correlates with
∆ ≈ 100ms of physical time); b) different psychological functions operate on different
scales of physical time. In Krennikov (2000) mental time was described mathematically
by using p-adic hierarchic trees.
20As was mentioned in footnote 14, see section 2.2, it is more natural to call a and b
supplementary and incompatible.
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ical details.
Postulate QLR. The brain is able to create the QL-representation of
mental contexts, C → ψC (by using the algorithm based on the formula of
total probability with interference, see section 5).
8 Brain as quantum-like computer
We can speculate that the ability of the brain to create the QL-representation
of mental contexts, see Postulate QLR, induces functioning of the brain as a
quantum-like computer.
Postulate QLC. The brain performs computation-thinking by using al-
gorithms of quantum computing in the complex Hilbert space of mental QL-
states.
We emphasize that in our approach the brain is not quantum computer,
but QL-computer. On one hand, QL-computer works totally in accordance
with mathematical theory of quantum computations (so by using quantum
algorithms). On the other hand, it is not based on superposition of individ-
ual mental states. The complex amplitude ψC representing a mental context
C is a special probabilistic representation of information states of the huge
neuronal ensemble. In particular, the brain is macroscopic QL-computer.
Thus the QL-parallelism (in the opposite to conventional quantum paral-
lelism) has a natural realistic base. This is real parallelism in working of
millions of neurons. The crucial point is the way in which this classical par-
allelism is projected onto dynamics of QL-states. The QL-brain is able to
solve NP-problems. But there is nothing mysterious in this ability: expo-
nentially increasing number of operations is performed through involving of
exponentially increasing number of neurons.
We pay attention that by coupling QL-parallelism to working of neurons
we started to present a particular ontic model for QL-computations. We
shall discuss it in more detail. Observables a and b are self-observations of
brain. They can be represented as functions of the internal state of brain ω.
Here ω is a parameter of huge dimension describing states of all neurons in
brain: ω = (ω1, ω2, ..., ωN) :
a = a(ω), b = b(ω).
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The brain is not interested in concrete values of the reference observables at
fixed instances of time. The brain finds the contextual probability distribu-
tions paC(x) and p
b
C(y) and creates the mental QL-state ψC(x), see algorithm
in section 5. Then it works with ψC(x) by using algorithms of quantum
computing. The crucial problem is to find mechanism of calculating of con-
textual probabilities. We think that they are frequency probabilities which
are created in the brain in the following way.
There are two scales of time: a) internal scale; b) QL-scale. The internal
scale is finer than the QL-scale. Each instant of QL-time t corresponds
to an interval ∆ of internal time τ. We might identify the QL-time with
mental (psychological) time and the internal time with physical time. During
the interval ∆ of internal time the brain collects statistical data for self-
observations of a and b.
Thus the internal state ω of the brain evolves as ω = ω(τ, ω0). At each in-
stance of internal time τ there are performed nondisturbative self-measurements
of a and b. These are realistic measurements: the brain gets values a(ω(τ, ω0)),
b(ω(τ, ω0)). By finding frequencies of realization of fixed values for a(ω(τ, ω0))
and b(ω(τ, ω0)) the brain obtains the frequency probabilities p
a
C(x) and p
b
C(y).
These probabilities are related to the instant of QL-time time t corresponding
to the interval of internal time ∆ : paC(t, x) and p
b
C(t, y).
For example, a and b can be measurements over different domains of
brain. It is supposed that the brain can “feel” probabilities (frequencies)
paC(x) and p
b
C(y), but not able to “feel” the simultaneous probability distri-
bution pC(x, y) = P (a = x, b = y/C). This is not the problem of mathe-
matical existence of such a distribution.21 This is the problem of integration
of statistics of observations from different domains of the brain. By us-
ing the QL-representation based only on probabilities paC(x) and p
b
C(y) the
brain could be able to escape integration of information about individual
self-observations of variables a and b related to spatially separated domains
of brain. The brain need not couple these domains at each instant of internal
time τ. It couples them only once in the interval ∆ through the contextual
probabilities paC(x) and p
b
C(y). This induces the huge saving of time.
21We recall that, since we consider only two realistic observables, there is no direct
contradiction with Bell’s inequality.
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9 Evolution of mental wave function
The mental wave function ψ(t) evolves in the complex Hilbert space (space
of probability amplitudes, see section 5). The straightforward generalization
of quantum mechanics would imply the linear Schro¨dinger equation:
i
dψ(t)
dt
= Hˆψ(t), ψ(0) = ψ0, (14)
where Hˆ : H → H is a self-adjoint operator in the Hilbert space H of
mental QL-states. However, the Va¨xjo¨ model predicts, Khrennikov (2004),
broader spectrum of evolutions in the Hilbert space (induced by evolutions of
contexts). We could not go deeply into mathematical details and only remark
that in general the contextual dynamics C → C(t) can induce nonlinear
evolutions in H :
i
dψ(t)
dt
= Hˆ(ψ(t)), ψ(0) = ψ0, (15)
where Hˆ : H → H is a nonlinear map. It is important to point out that even
the nonlinear dynamics in the Hilbert state space induced by a contextual
dynamics is unitary: (ψ(t), ψ(t)) = (ψ(0), ψ(0)).
In principle,
there are no a priory reasons to assume that the mental quantum-like
dynamics should always be linear!
It might be that nonlinearity of the Hilbert space dynamics is the distin-
guishing feature of cognitive systems. However, at the present time this is
just a speculation. Therefore it would be interesting to consider a linear men-
tal quantum-like dynamics.22 For example, let us consider a quantum-like
Hamiltonian:
Hˆ ≡ H(aˆ, bˆ) = bˆ
2
2
+ V (aˆ), (16)
where V : X → R is a “mental potential” (e.g. a polynomial), cf Khrennikov
(1999, 2000, 2003). We call Hˆ the operator of mental energy. Denote by ψj
stationary mental QL-states: Hˆψj = µjψj. Then any mental QL-state ψ can
be represented as a superposition of stationary states:
ψ = k1ψ1 + k2ψ2, kj ∈ C, |k1|2 + |k2|2 = 1. (17)
22In any event linear dynamics can be considered as an approximation of nonlinear
dynamics.
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One might speculate that the brain has the ability to feel superpositions (17)
of stationary mental QL-states. In such a case superposition would be an
element of mental reality. However, it seems not be the case. Suppose that
ψ1 corresponds to zero mental energy, µ1 = 0. For example, such a QL-state
can be interpreted as the state of depression. Let µ2 >> 0. For example,
such a QL-state can be interpreted as the state of excitement. My internal
mental experience tells that I do not have a feeling of superposition of states
of depression and high excitement. If I am not in one of those stationary
states, then I am just in a new special mental QL-state ψ and I have the
feeling of this ψ and not superposition.23 Thus it seems that the expansion
(17) is just a purely mathematical feature of the model.
10 Noninjectivity of correspondence between
classical subconsciousness and quantum-
like consciousness
We use here the interpretation proposed in the previous section and pay
attention that the map Ja/b : Ctr → Φ(X,C), see section 5, is not one-to-
one. Thus it can be that a few different contexts C,C ′, .. are represented
by the same mental QL-state ψ. Suppose now that this is a stationary state
– an eigenstate of the operator of mental energy. We pay attention that in
general the corresponding mental context is not uniquely determined. QL-
stationarity of a state ψj can be based on a rather complex dynamics of
context, Cj(t), in subconsiousness.
11 Structure the set of states of mental sys-
tems
We recall few basic notions of the statistical formalism of quantum theory,
see, e.g., Holevo (2001). States of quantum systems are mathematically rep-
resented by density operators – positive operators ρ of unit trace. Pure states
(wave functions) ψ are represented by vectors belonging to the unit sphere
of a Hilbert space – corresponding density operators ρψ are the orthogonal
23We exclude abnormal behavior such as manic-depressive syndrome.
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projectors onto one dimensional subspaces corresponding to vectors ψ. The
set D of states (density operators) is a convex set.
In the two dimensional case (corresponding to dichotomous observables –
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers) the set D can be represented as the unit ball in the three
dimensional real space R3. Pure states are represented as the unit sphere,
Bloch sphere. Here the whole set D is the convex hall of the Bloch sphere S,
i.e., of the set of pure states.
In our mental QL-model some contexts (producing trigonometric interfer-
ence) are represented by points in S.We can also consider statistical mixtures
of these pure states. Let SCtr = J
a/b(Ctr) (the image of the set of populations
Ctr). Then the set of mental states DCtr coincides with the convex hall of
the SCtr. There are no reasons to suppose that SCtr would coincide with the
Bloch sphere S. Thus there is no reasons to suppose that the set of mental
QL-states DCtr would coincide with the set of quantum states D. It is the
fundamental problem24 to describe the set of pure quantum-like metal states
SCtr for various classes of cognitive systems.
We might speculate that SP depends essentially on a class of cognitive
system. So Shuman
P
does not equal to S leon
P
. We can even speculate that in
the process of evolution the set SP have been increasing and S
human
P is the
maximal set of mental states. It might even occur that ShumanP coincides with
the Bloch sphere.
12 Single-mind, many minds and Va¨xjo¨ ap-
proaches
As was pointed by Barret (1999), p. 211: “Just as with many-worlds theories,
there are many many-minds formulations of quantum mechanics.” It seems that
the approach of Albert and Loewer (1988) to the many-minds theory is the
most close to our approach. It was created to provide a more natural foun-
dations of Everett’s many-worlds interpretation. One could easier accept the
presence of many minds than many worlds. However, we are not so much
interested in the original aim of the many-minds approach as a mental inter-
pretation of Everett’s many-worlds quantum mechanics. We are interested
on consequences of Albert–Loewer theory for cognitive science. We start with
so called single-mind theory, see e.g. Barret (1999) for compact and simple
24Of course, if you would accept our quantum-like statistical ideology.
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presentation: “The single-mind theory is a sort of hidden-variable theory, but
instead of taking positions as always determinate, one takes mental states as al-
ways determinate. ... This explanation of the determinacy of experience requires
one to adopt a theory of mind where an observer’s mental state is well defined
at an instant.” It is very important for us that “The individual minds, as on
the [single-mind theory], are not quantum mechanical systems; they are never in
superposition”. Such a viewpoint to individual minds is also characteristic
for our contextual realistic mental model: a single mind could not be in a
superposition of states; in particular, interference is not a self-interference
of a single mind. We remark that the Albert–Loewer and Va¨xjo¨ approaches
differ crucially from quantum logic approach. In the latter a single mind is in
a superposition of mental states and mental interference is a self-interference
of mind.
Albert and Loewer (1988, 1992) also created a many-minds theory. In
this theory, see Albert and Loewer (1988), p.206, 130 and Barett (1999),
p.192, : “ ... every sentient physical system, every observer, is associated with not
a single mind but rather a continuous infinity of minds. Each mind is supposed to
evolve exactly as described in the single-mind theory; there are just more of them
associated with each observer.” This picture does not contradict to our con-
textual statistical realistic model of mental reality. However, we emphasize
again (see introduction for comparison with Bohmian mechanics) that the
Va¨xjo¨ model is just an observational model like the orthodox Copenhagen
model.25 Therefore we are not interested in what happens really in the brain
(e.g., how those single minds evolve). For us it is important only the presence
of ensembles of minds in that each mind has a determinate state.
From the point of view of the many-minds model we do the following
thing. Denote the collection of observer’s minds (at some instant) by C. In
the Va¨xjo¨ terminology this is a mental (or cognitive) context. Consider two
incompatible mental observables a and b (e.g. given in the form of questions).
Then we can construct a mental wave function ψC , see section 5, representing
the collection of minds C.
Another many-minds interpretation was proposed by Lookwood (1989,
1996). In the debate between Lookwood (1996) and Loewer (1996) we would
choose the side of Albert and Loewer. As in the theory of Albert and Loewer
(1988), we assume that minds have definite states at each instant. We also
assume random dynamics of minds (in subconsiousness, see section 7). There-
25The main difference is that the Va¨xjo¨ model is realistic (for the reference observables).
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fore minds in the Va¨xjo¨ model as well as in the Albert–Loewer (1988) model
“have reliable memories of their own past mental states,” p. 121. As was pointed
by Barret (1999), the latter assumption about memories implies that Lock-
wood’s belief “that his theory is empirically equivalent to Albert and Loewer’s”
was not justified (“since minds on Lookwood’s many-minds theory do not have
even transcendental identities,” p.210). Neither our theory could be connected
to Lookwood’s theory. 26
13 On the notion of macroscopic quantum
system
The study of macroscopic quantum systems is the subject of the greatest
interest for foundations of quantum mechanics as well as its applications.
However, I would like to pay attention to the fact that (at least for me) it is
not clear:
“What can be called a macroscopic quantum system?”
Of course, this question is closely related to the old question:
“What can be called a quantum system?”
There is no common point of view to such notions as quantization, quan-
tum theory. For me (in the opposition to N. Bohr) the presence of quanta
(of, e.g., energy) is not the main distinguishing feature of quantum theory.
Of course, the presence of observables (e.g., energy) with discrete spectra is
an important feature of quantum theory. However, the basic quantum ob-
servables, the position and the momentum, still have continuous ranges of
values. I think that the main point is that quantum theory is a statistical
theory. Therefore it should be characterized in statistical terms. We should
find the basic feature of quantum theory which distinguishes this theory form
classical statistical mechanics. The interference of probabilities is such a basic
statistical feature of quantum theory. Therefore any system (material or not)
which exhibits (for some observables) the interference of probabilities should
be considered as a quantum system (or say “quantum-like system”). Thus,
since human beings by replying to special pairs of questions produce, see
26Here we do not discuss many-minds theory of Donald (1990, 1995, 1996), since his
approach is based on the reductionist idea that “quantumness of mind” is a consequence
of “quantumness of brain” as a physical system. As was pointed out in introduction,
our model could be used neither as an argument for supporting nor rejecting quantum
reductionism.
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Conte et al. (2004), interference of probabilities, they should be considered
as macroscopic quantum systems.27
As I understood, for physicists a macroscopic quantum system is a huge
ensemble of microscopic quantum systems (e.g., electrons) prepared in a spe-
cial state. Human being is also a huge ensemble of microscopic quantum sys-
tems... However, the state of this ensemble cannot be considered as quantum
from the traditional point of view. Nevertheless, according to our interfer-
ence viewpoint to quantumness human being is quantum (but not because
it is composed of microscopic quantum systems).
In the connection with our discussion on the definition of a macroscopic
quantum system it is natural to mention experiments of A. Zeilinger and his
collaborators on interference of probabilities for fullerens and other macro-
molecules including bimolecular porphyrin. It seems that A. Zeilinger uses
the same definition of quantumness as I. It is interesting that one of the
main aims of further experiments of A. Zeilinger is to find the interference of
probabilities for some viruses. I think that at that point he will come really
very close to my viewpoint to macroscopic quantum systems, in particular,
biological quantum systems.
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